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Abstract 
The main objective of this paper is to examine the impact of the quality of financial reporting 
on threats of block shareholders of the companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange. Therefore, the 
Herfindahl index is used as a benchmark to measure the competitiveness of block shareholders. 
Also, the quality of the financial information is also examined from four aspects including 
discretionary accruals quality, discretionary income, and cash flows over the remaining accruals. 
The population of this study is companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange and a sample of 140 
companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange is selected and studied from 2002 to 2012. Multivariate 
linear regression analysis is used to test the research hypothesis. The research hypothesis testing 
results showed a positive relation between the quality of financial reporting standards and the threat 
of withdrawal of block shareholders. Thus, the results showed that the threat of withdrawal of block 
shareholders as an important factor plays a significant role in revealing by directors. 
Keywords: block shareholders, accruals quality, and the quality of financial reporting, 
Herfindahl index. 
Introduction 
Shareholders are one of the main users of financial information. Shareholders can be divided 
into natural and legal persons who are known in financial literature to "institutional investors" 
(Ebrahimi Kordlar, 2007). The institutional investors of investment firms and other businesses are 
the ownership of shares of major companies that have a considerable influence on the companies 
and also have access to the information about the company's future prospects. However, investors 
and shareholders are considered professionals in their decisions about stock companies. Institutional 
investors in corporate governance are strong recovery mechanisms that can monitor the company's 
management, because they can have a significant influence on the management of company and 
they are in line with management's interests and shareholders' interests. Concentration of ownership 
is in the hands of institutional investors to control agency problems and improve the protection of 
the interests of investors (Ebrahimi Kordlar, 2007). Institutional ownership in corporate governance 
is key factor to the equity. Owners (shareholders) of the company have different rights such as the 
rights of the selection board which serve as a proxy for monitoring the performance of managers. On 
the other hand, the major shareholders have a major role in the transmission of information to other 
shareholders. They can acquire and transmit private information of management information to 
others (Najjar & Taylor, 2008). Several research results have shown that the corporate governance 
mechanisms such as ownership structure, board structure, etc. have a devastating effect on the 
company's performance and value. The corporate governance system could explain the gap between 
accounting and market measures to some extent. In fact, the main objective of this study is to see 
how big the threat of withdrawal of shareholders block the quality of financial reporting is. In other 
words, we look at variables such as ownership and institutional ownership of property managers and 
shareholders to block what effect the quality of financial reporting. Companies select the quality of 
their financial information and the disclosure of financial information, the expected benefits against 
 
  Special Issue on New Dimensions in Economics, Accounting and Management 
   
 
Openly accessible at http://www.european-science.com                                                                   978 
 
the costs caused by the high quality of information disclosure measure. Providing high financial 
information quality may asymmetry the information between companies and their investors and 
reduces agency costs. Despite these benefits, it is expected that companies disclose information as 
possible in the absence of any costs, choose the highest level of quality financial information. 
Literature Review 
There are institutional investors in the ownership structure. Agency theory asserts 
institutional investors to have incentive and power of monitoring and managing to ensure that the 
company management is a useful guide. If management does not act against the interests of 
shareholders, it could change the composition of the board. There are major shareholders in the 
business unit that are associated with operational decisions and financial compensation. Studies in 
this area often review the company's stock units and connect the retrospective financial measures 
(criteria such as efficiency and cost accounting) to the company's operational decisions. Previous 
researches by studying the market indicated the benefits of the company and directors of an 
information over other people who are out of the organization. Therefore, there is information 
asymmetry that affects the major shareholders of companies and their stock performance. The extent 
of this impact depends on the type of major shareholders in the company. Recent empirical studies 
indicated that major shareholders are trying to reduce agency costs through confidential information. 
Brokman and Yan (2009) reviewed major shareholders and specific information of company and 
found a positive correlation between the presence of major shareholders and the accuracy of the 
information of companies. They stated that the blocks’ shareholders benefit from an advantage over 
other shareholders in terms of accuracy and confidentiality of information acquisition costs. Firms 
also have incentives to respond to the demand of users for firm-specific information because they 
can reduce their capital expenditures by reducing information asymmetry between companies and 
their investors (Haley & Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001). It is expected that external demand for 
financial information takes place in the companies that have a high level of shareholders who want 
to keep their shares in the long run. Boubakri and Labgvr addressed corporate ownership structure 
and found that analysts are more willing to prosecute the companies that have centralized ownership 
structure. Considering previous researches on the effects of different types of major shareholders 
have shown the effects of ownership structure on corporate information environment and the present 
study seek to examine whether heterogeneity is a major shareholder of a determinant of information 
asymmetry firms. Information is based on the idea that major shareholders have an advantage over 
other shareholders and also argues that these shareholders are seeking confidential information 
which increases the information asymmetry with increasing heterogeneity of major shareholders. 
Block shareholders have limited activities and interests of shareholders and managers to align 
management opportunity and thus they have reduced incentives to manipulate earnings management 
(Dichev et al., 1996; Farber, 2005).Therefore, it can be expected that the quality of financial 
reporting has positive impact on block of shareholder of companies. Also, according to economic 
theory, poor performance management of shareholders leads to their block and they are threatened 
to sell their shares (Admat and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 2011). To 
prevent the sale of shares by the block shareholders and consequently to reduce the company's stock 
price, managers tend to align their actions with those of block shareholders (Doo et al., 2014). 
Recent theories and empirical studies have found that block shareholders influence the company's 
power (shareholder who owns more than 5% of the company's total shares) by threatening to pull 
the company. These shareholders have strong incentives to collect private information and attempt 
to sell their shares when the company believes that they have reached to its intrinsic value. In this 
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regard, Two and colleagues (2014) also believed that the threat of withdrawal of block shareholders 
of companies is one of the factors that can change the quality of the data reported by them. 
Methodology 
The library method is used to collect data from books, magazines and specialized Persian and 
Latin sites. Companies also have to collect the data needed by using processor and the official 
website of the Stock Exchange. The data is analyzed by using Excel software, SPSS version 19 and 
Eviews 7. 
This study is done in eleven-year period from 2002 to 2012. The companies listed in Tehran 
Stock Exchange constitute the study sample. Because there is some inconsistency between 
members, the following criteria were used to select the sample: 
a. The company's fiscal year should be ended in March each year. 
b. The financial year of company should not be changed from 2002 to 2012. 
c. The available information is needed in order to extract the required data. 
d. Companies should be accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange by the end of fiscal year 2002. 
e. There should be at least four companies in the case of industry. 
f. Banks and financial institutions (investment companies, financial intermediation, holding 
companies and leasing-in) were excluded because their financial disclosure and corporate 
governance structures are different. 
Variables 
Independent variable: The independent variable of this study is the threat of withdrawal of 
block shareholders of the Company. The block shareholder competitiveness index (Herfindahl 
index) is used to measure the threat of withdrawal of the company's block shareholders as follows. 
∑
1=
2
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k ti
tik
ti Block
Block
BHCOMP
                                                                                   (1) 
In the above equation  ، tikBlock ,,   represents the number of shares held by the block 
shareholder for firm i in year t and tiBlock , represents the total number of shares held by shareholders 
block. 
Dependent variable: The dependent variable of this study is to measure the quality of 
financial reporting. Four criteria are used to measure the quality of financial reporting which 
including: 
Discretionary accruals (DisTA), the criteria used to measure the quality of financial 
reporting. Model number (2) in each industry is estimated for each year to measure discretionary 
accruals: 
Accri,t = α0 + α1(1/TAi,t-1) + α2(ΔREVi,t) + α3(PPEi,t) + α4(ROAi,t) + εi,t                     (2) 
In the above model, Accr represents the total accruals, TA represents total assets, ΔREV 
represents operating income divided by total assets in the beginning of year, PPE shows the net 
assets, machinery and equipment divided by total assets in the beginning of period, ROA shows the 
total return on assets (net income divided by average total assets), i represents the company, and t 
represents the year. It should be noted that in the above model, the non-cash accruals are equal to the 
change in current assets minus current liabilities' change in non-interest expenses divided by total 
assets minus tangible and intangible assets amortization expense. The model number (2) measures 
the discretionary accruals (precaution). In this study, the absolute value of discretionary accruals is 
considered as a first indicator of the quality of financial reporting. 
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The second criterion is used to measure the quality of financial reporting. The quality of 
accruals (DisWCA) is based on a modified model Dechow and Dichev (2002). For this purpose, the 
model number (3) in each industry is estimated for each year: 
WCAi,t = α0 + α1(OCFi,t-1) + α2(OCFi,t) + α3(OCFi,t+1) + α4(ΔREVi,t) + α5(PPEi,t) + 
α6(DOCFi,t) + α7(OCFi,t* DOCFi,t) + εi,t                                                                                        (3) 
In this model, WCA represents working capital accruals, OCF represents operating cash 
flows (total gross cost minus depreciation and changes in current liabilities' change in current assets) 
divided by total assets in the beginning of period , ΔREV reflects changes in annual sales divided by 
total assets in the beginning of period, PPE represents the net assets, machinery and equipment 
divided by total assets in the beginning of period, DOCF variable is planar if cash flow from 
operations is the number one option and zero. Otherwise, i represents the company and t represents 
the year. Meanwhile, working capital accruals of similar study by Chen et al (2011) is equivalent to 
the change in current assets other than cash, minus the change in current liabilities, except the 
current portion of long-term debt divided by total assets in the beginning of period. The model 
number (3) showed that in accruals error estimation is not associated with operating cash flow and it 
cannot be explained by changes in income and fixed assets. The remaining amount is modeled as 
accruals quality. Therefore, what is a negative working capital accrual, is more indicative of the 
quality of financial reporting. The third criterion is used to measure the quality of financial reporting 
model (4) which is based on discretionary income. This model is estimated for each year in each 
industry (Steuben, 2010; Mac Nichols and Steuben, 2008): 
ΔARi,t = α0 + α1(ΔREVi,t) + εi,t                                                                                           (4) 
In model (4), ΔAR indicates receivables divided by total assets, beginning of period 
represents the changes, ΔREV represents annual income divided by total assets, beginning of period 
represents a change, i represents the company, and t represents the year. The remaining model (4) is 
discretionary incomes (DisRev). Discretionary income is multiplied by model (1). Higher incomes 
and higher levels of discretionary accruals are indicative of the quality of reporting. The fourth 
measure of the quality of financial reporting is based on the ratio of the remaining accruals to cash 
flows (AccrCash) (Borgostahler et al., 2006).To avoid boundary values, the conversion ratio of 
control and then the model (1) are multiplied, so that higher values represent higher quality accruals. 
Control variables 
The control variables in this study are as follows: LIQUIDITYi, t: the liquidity index is 
calculated by dividing operating cash flow to total assets. Log_Assetsi, t: logarithm of total assets at 
year-end. 
ROEi, t: rate of return on equity. Std_ROAi, t: standard deviation of asset returns. Levi, t: 
long-term debt plus current liabilities (current portion) divided by total assets. Growthi, t: current 
year sales growth of the company. OCi, t: the company's operating cycle is calculated as follows: 
)365(
2)(
)365(
2)( 1_1_
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INVINV
sales
ARAR
OC ttttti

                                                                         (5) 
In the above equation, AR represents a company's receivables, INV represents the company's 
inventory, Sales represents the company's sales, and COGS indicates the company's cost of finished 
goods sold.Capital_Needi, t: percentage change in intake facilities and equity.Invi, t: total inventory 
divided by total assets.Lossi, t: Percent of the losses of the company or bars are surveyed non-years. 
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Research hypotheses testing 
This section deals with the methods of the research hypothesis testing. The combination of 
picture and an ordinary least squares regression is used to analyze the data. In this context, the low 
regression model is used to test the research hypotheses. 
FRQi,t = α0 + α1(BHCOMPi,t) + α2(LIQUIDITYi,t) + α3(BHCOMPi,t* LIQUIDITYi,t) + 
α4(Log_Assetsi,t) + α5(ROEi,t) + α6(Std_ROAi,t) + α7(Levi,t) + α8(Growthi,t) + α9(OCi,t) + 
α10(Capital_Needi,t) + α11(Invi,t) + α12(Lossi,t) + εi,t                                                                   (5) 
In the top model FRQi,t represents the four criteria of financial reporting quality of firm i in 
year t and the remaining variables are defined as before. In model (5) coefficient α3 shows the 
relationship between the quality of financial reporting and the threat of withdrawal of block 
shareholders. 
Results 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables. According to this table, the statistics 
of the variable leverage (LEV) shows that more than half of the company's assets are financed by 
debt. The mean of the variable ratio of inventory to total assets (Inv) indicates that it constitutes 
about 25% of the company's assets and inventory. Statistics relating to the variable year sales growth 
(Growth) shows that the average growth rate is about 25% of corporate sales. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for variables 
According to Table 2, the results of the Chow test are used to test the research hypothesis. 
According to this table, Chow test results show that the hybrid model (Pooled Model) should be 
used to test hypothesis.  
Table 2. Test results Chow  
Test result Significance level Fisher-sectional statisticsType of test 
Combined data 0.241 29.146 Chow test 
Table 3 presents the results of the research hypothesis testing. Given the amount of F 
statistics contained in Table 3, the level of all the companies which is equal to 3.206, 3.812, 2.708 
and 3.633, the models indicate significant at 95%. Moreover, according to the statistics presented in 
Table 3, Durbin Watson at all times with companies 2.132, 1.995, 2.027 and 2.062 denies the 
existence of correlation following the disruption components regression. Table 3 shows the 
coefficients of the regression model to test the research hypothesis and its meaningful level.  
 
DisTADisTADisRevAccr 
Cash 
Accr 
Cash 
INV LEV ROE Std 
ROA
OC Capital 
Need 
Loss GROWTH Model variables 
1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 Samples 
-0.1720.172-0.210-.731 .731 .253 .652 .135 .198 0.2460.640 0.2750.248 Mean 
-0.0390.039--0.051.720 .720 .236 .670 0.107.178 .221 .662 0.000.198 Middle 
-0.9800.980--0.940-1.020 -1.020 0.000 0.3500.0000.0600.0700.270 0.0000.000 Fashion 
0.2570.257.282 1.622 1.622 0.128 .162 .283 0.1150.133.158 .447 0.470 SD 
-1.7091.709-1.235-0.152 0.152 .438 0.657-.109 .919 1.0220.679- 1.0097.463 Coefficient of skewness 
1.8611.8610.2261.737 1.737 0.045 0.0780.028-.422 1.305.074 0.984-100.380 Slenderness factor 
0.9800.980.940 12.310 12.310 .730 .880 1,550.520 .730 0.800 1.0008.630 Variations 
-0.9800.980-0.940--5.010 -5.010 0.000 0.1200.680-0.0600.0700.100 0.0000.950- Minimum amplitude 
0.0000.0000.0007.310 7.310 .730 1.000.870 0.5700.8000.900 1.0007.680 Maximum amplitude 
-0.216-0.216-0.216-0.365 -0.150 -0.150 .157 .561 -0.015.132 0.144 .544 0.000 .066 Quarter 
-0.039-0.039-0.039-0.051 .720 .720 .236 .670 0.107.178 .221 .662 0.000 .198 
-0.0010.001 -0.001 --0.001 1.563 1.563 .336 .770 0.303.263 0.315 .757 1.000 .334 
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Table 3. Results of the research hypothesis 
Quality of financial reporting standards Explanatory 
variables DisTA DisWCA DisRev AccrCash 
Coeffic
ients 
T-statistics
(sig.) 
Coeffici
ents 
T-statistics
(sig) 
Coeffi
cients
T-statistics
(sig) 
Coeffici
ents 
T-statistics 
(sig) 
0.1990.707 (0.480) -0.030 
-0.219 
(0.827) -0.772
-2.538 
(0.011) 1.731 
0.975 
(0.330) 
Constant 
Value 
-0.004-0.193 (0.874) 0.014 
1.486 
(0.138) 0.028
1.324 
(0.186) 0.096 
0.767 
(0.443) 
BHCOMP 
-0.005-0.275 (0.784) -0.007 
-0.684 
(0.492) -0.007
-0.304 
(0.761) 0.018 
0.142 
(0.887) 
LIQUIDITY 
1.0093.455 (0.005) 1.001 
3.129 
(0.0005) 0.910
3.486 
(0.0005) 1.010 
3.081 
(0.0005) 
BHCOMP* 
LIQUIDITY 
-0.013-0.635 (0.526) -0.002 
-0.217 
(0.827) 0.017
0.767 
(0.444) -0.108
-0.848 
(0.397) 
Log_Assets 
-0.004-0.506 (0.613) 0.0001 
0.128 
(0.898) 0.002
0.207 
(0.836) -0.030
-0.622 
(0.534) 
ROE 
0.0070.087 (0.931) 0.001 
-0.005 
(0.996) 0.057
0.659 
(0.501) -0.805
1.595 
(0.111) 
Std_ROA 
-0.031-0.492 (0.623) 0.055 
1.775 
(0.076) 0.278
4.03 
(0.0005) -0.102
-0.252 
(0.801) 
Lev 
0.00010.614 (0.540) 0.0001 
0.452 
(0.652) 0.001
1.124 
(0.262) -0.002
-0.524 
(0.601) 
Growth 
-0.097-1.004 (0.316) -0.028 
0.587 
(0.557) 0.117
1.115 
(0.265) -0.113
-0.184 
(0.854) 
OC 
0.063-3.0001 (0.003) -0.011 
-1.096 
(0.247) 0.007
0.321 
(0.748) -0.155
-1.170 
(0.243) 
Capital_Nee
d 
0.9703.790 (0.005) 0.0001 
0.160 
(0.870) -0.246
-1.063 
(0.291) -0.022
-0.960 
(0.340) 
Inv 
0.1101.170 (0.250) 0.170 
1.720 
(0.090) 0.186
1.860 
(0.066) 0.350 
0.510 
(0.601) 
Loss 
2.132 1.995 2.027 2.062 
Durbin 
Watson 
statistic  
3.2060.0005 3.812 0.0005 2.7080.003 3.633 0.0005 
F-statistics 
and 
significance 
levels 
0.003 0.003 0.024 0.005 R2adj 
According to this table, the significant interaction effect of variable liquidity index and 
Herfindahl index (BHCOMP * LIQUIDITY) indicates that there is a significant and positive 
relationship between this variable and each of the four financial reporting quality criteria used in this 
study at 95%. Based on these findings, the research hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 95% 
reliability level which means that the threats of withdrawal of block shareholders are the decisive 
factor in the quality of corporate financial reporting. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper provided evidence regarding the effect of the threat of withdrawal of block 
shareholders on the quality of financial information reported by companies. In this regard, this study 
investigated 140 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange in the period from 2002 to 2012. 
Research hypothesis testing results indicate that the threat of withdrawal of block shareholders has 
positive and significant relationship with quality of financial information reporting. The results of 
this hypothesis testing are consistent with the research finding of Doo et al. (2014).This means that 
the effective participation of stakeholders in the block structure of corporate ownership improves the 
corporate value, because shareholders seeking profits and better performance and the fulfillment of 
this goal are influential on the corporate structure of ownership. Also, the centralized ownership 
structure and purpose of profit lead to more control over the performance and enhance corporate 
value and quality of financial information reporting. The findings suggest that there are incentives to 
improve the performance of managers and block shareholders and the ability of discipline managers 
who do not move in the direction of their interests and this may reflect the fact that block 
shareholders are actively managed their portfolio and managers are encouraged to make optimal 
decisions. Also, companies that are present on board of the block shareholders have higher value. In 
other words, to monitor the management of the block shareholders at the Board of Directors, 
managers are forced to pay more attention to the performance of the business and increase the 
company's value and quality of financial information reporting. Shareholders and other users of 
financial reports consider the presence of a certain number of block shareholders in a company to 
obtain reasonable assurance about the quality of financial information reporting. Also, it is 
recommended that the Tehran Stock Exchange considers the laws and regulations in order to 
determine the quality of financial information reporting and transparency. It is recommended to use 
other criteria to assess the relationship between threats of withdrawal of block shareholders and 
quality of financial information reporting. 
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